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YOU CAN’T TAKE THE SKY FROM ME: 
A GRAMSCIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF 
MANKIND PRINCIPLE IN SPACE LAW 
Greg Melchin* 
ABSTRACT 
The common heritage of [hu]mankind (CHM) principle is an element of the 
Moon Treaty of 1979 that was foreshadowed by the Outer Space Treaty of 
1967. However, its precise content and legal implications have been the subject 
of conflicting interpretations. This paper will apply a Gramscian analysis to the 
formation of international law. Gramscian theory is a school of neo-Marxist 
International Relations (IR) theory that focuses upon the ways in which a 
dominant historic bloc (called the “hegemon”) maintains control over other 
groups. This paper applies Gramscian theory to the power dynamics in 
international law in order to gain insight into the current state of the CHM 
principle as it applies to space resource law. 
The CHM principle has had little impact on the development of space 
law. Although existing space treaties enshrine CHM to varying degrees, the 
principle is too vague in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to have had much 
impact, and no major space powers are parties to the 1979 Moon Treaty. Given 
the dominance of space travel in the 20th century by imperialistic superpowers, 
any interpretation of the CHM principle is consonant with the preservation of 
hegemony. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The common heritage of [hu]mankind (CHM) principle is an element of the 
Moon Treaty of 1979, and is foreshadowed1 in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. 
However, despite the principle’s decades-old existence, its precise content and 
legal implications remain subject to conflicting interpretations. This article adopts 
a Gramscian approach to the formation of international law in order to demystify 
the reasons for disagreement. Gramscian theory is a school of neo-Marxist 
International Relations (IR) theory that focuses upon the ways in which a 
dominant historic bloc (called the hegemon) maintains control over other 
groups. Applying Gramscian theory to the power dynamics in international law 
provides insight into the current state of the CHM principle as it applies to space 
resource law. 
This article contains three parts: (i) an introduction to Gramscian analysis, 
(ii) a brief overview of the CHM principle and its development in treaty law, and 
(iii) a Gramscian analysis of the legal effect of the CHM principle.  
1. GRAMSCIAN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Given the brutality and eventual disintegration of Eastern Bloc regimes and 
the dissimilarity between existing, nominally Communist economic systems and 
anything resembling traditional Marxism, critics may be inclined to view Marxist 
analysis as a spent force with little relevance to current discourse on international 
law. Yet neo-Marxist theories of power and control, which have been refined and 
debated for decades by academics, can offer invaluable insights into the processes 
of international law. Duncan Kennedy suggests that Gramscian thought is a 
particularly “palatable” form of Marxism for the theory of international law since 
it is analytical, rather than prescriptive, and because it is not associated with Soviet 
Communism.2 Indeed, one does not have to support traditional Marxist 
objectives such as a stateless society and the abolition of private property to 
                                                                                                                                            
1  See Section 2.2.1 below. 
2  Duncan Kennedy, “Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System” (1982) 6 Am Legal Stud F 32 at 32–33. 
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accept the utility of a nuanced theory of power to legal scholarship. This is 
particularly true in the sphere of international law, in which asymmetries of power 
are most evident. This article applies Gramscian analysis only to determine lex lata 
(law as it exists); examining lex ferenda (emerging law) according to Gramscian 
thought is beyond the paper’s limited scope. 
1.1  Elements of Gramscian Analysis 
Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was an Italian intellectual and political figure 
who co-founded the Italian Communist Party. In 1924, Gramsci was imprisoned 
by the Mussolini government and spent the remainder of his life in prison. 
Gramscian theory has its origins in his Prison Notebooks, which have proven highly 
influential on Western Marxism, despite their fragmented and sometimes 
contradictory nature. Two main themes arise from Gramsci’s Notebooks: (i) a 
democratic process for Marxist class struggle based on education and the role of 
intellectuals in public life, and (ii) a theory of hegemony.3 Although the former 
has proven highly influential, particularly in the realm of popular education and 
the field of development studies through its influence on Paulo Freire and others, 
the theory of hegemony is more relevant to the fields of IR and international law. 
1.1.1  Hegemony and Consent 
While some Marxist theorists focus upon the role of coercion in their 
analyses of structures of control in society, Gramsci argued that a hegemonic 
power, or hegemon, maintains its dominance through consent as well as coercion. 
In a vivid illustration of the nature of power, Gramsci referred to Machiavelli’s 
image of the centaur: half human (social consensus) and half animal (coercion).4 
According to Robert Cox, 
To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, 
hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in 
                                                                                                                                            
3  Maurice A Finocchiaro, “Antonio Gramsci” in Robert Audi, ed, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2d ed 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 353 at 353–354 
4  Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed & translated by Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) at 169–170. 
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marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of 
behaviour in most people most of the time.5 
Due to the fragmented and unsystematic nature of Gramsci’s Notebooks, the 
Gramscian school of IR draws upon the reconstruction and interpretation of 
Gramsci’s thought by successive academics and activists. Cox introduced 
Gramscian thought to the field of IR in the 1980s. In some respects, the 
Gramscian perspective on international law is similar to the realist perspective, 
insofar as both reject the positivist model of international law as being based on 
the rational choices of sovereign and equal states. The Gramscian and realist 
perspectives both view power dynamics as the drivers of international legal action 
and generation. However, Gramscian analysis in particular provides a useful 
vocabulary and analytical framework for discussing subtle applications of power 
in a voluntary legal system.6 
Although some contemporary neo-Gramscians contend that it is not states 
but ideological systems that become hegemonic,7 Cox maintained that in 
Gramscian thought the state is “the basic entity in international relations and the 
place where social conflicts take place.”8 States are prior to and generative of 
ideological systems through which they aspire to cast their interests in moral, 
universalistic language. Cox describes hegemony as “not an order in which one 
state directly exploits others but an order which most other states (or at least 
those within reach of the hegemony) could find compatible with their interests.”9 
Cox characterizes the 1945–1965 period as a time of American hegemony, while 
the period after 1965 saw the rise of would-be counter-hegemonies in the Eastern 
and New International Economic Order (NIEO, also known as the Group of 77 
or Third World) blocs.10 
                                                                                                                                            
5  Robert W Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method” (1983) 12:2 
Millennium J Int’l Stud 162 at 164. 
6  James D Fry, “Legitimacy Push: Towards a Gramscian Approach to International Law” (2008) 13 UCLA J 
Int’l L & Foreign Aff 307 at 312–313. 
7  See Stephen Gill, “Epistemology, Ontology and the ‘Italian School’” in Stephen Gill, ed, Gramsci, Historical 
Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 21 at 42. 
8  Cox, supra note 5 at 169. 
9  Ibid at 170. 
10  Ibid at 170–171. 
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Like realism, Gramscian thought regards a state’s compliance with a law not 
as acceptance of its moral rightness, but as a justifiable choice made in the absence 
of any real alternative. The lack of alternatives is a circumstance created by the 
hegemon; James Fry observes that such a situation also constitutes the traditional 
legal definition of duress.11 
1.1.2  Social Myth and Trasformismo 
Establishing hegemony involves the development of an ideological system 
that is universalist in scope. According to Augelli and Murphy, 
Idealist philosophy, whether of the right or the left, sees a radical 
separation between force and consensus, but in the real world these 
two forms of rule are mutually supportive and often combine in 
ambiguous ways. Force rarely appears as brute force, nor do the 
representatives of power justify its use by invoking the interests of the 
dominant social group or dominant social alliance, even though that 
must always be the ultimate reason why force is used in the place of 
rule by consensus. To mask the lack of consensus, the representatives 
of power always proclaim grand moral principles to justify the use of 
force.12 
The “grand moral principles” constitute an element of “social myth,” a term 
Gramsci appropriated from Georges Sorel. Social myth is a “collective 
subjectivity” in which actors envision themselves engaged in a struggle of 
“totalities” or opposed historical forces.13 Among other things, social myth serves 
classes engaged in revolutionary struggle by ideologically insulating its members 
from conversion by the dominant class. In establishing hegemony, the hegemon 
offers concessions to the dominated classes in order to render the hegemony 
more palatable.14 The hegemon justifies such reforms by co-opting the ideas of 
the revolutionary class and transforming them (trasformismo in Gramsci’s terms) 
into ideas amenable to hegemony. 
                                                                                                                                            
11  Fry, supra note 6 at 311. 
12  Enrico Augelli & Craig Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1988) at 128.  
13  Cox, supra note 5 at 167. 
14  Ibid at 163. 
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These ideas exist at one of three levels of “consciousness” within the 
movement towards the creation of hegemony:  
• the economico-corporative level, which is consciousness of the needs of a 
particular group; 
• the solidarity or class consciousness level, which is consciousness of 
needs of a broader economic class;  
• and the hegemonic level, “which brings the interests of the leading class 
into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these 
other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms.”15  
1.2 International Law as Hegemony 
The Gramscian perspective is a useful analytical tool for understanding and 
predicting the dynamics of international law. According to Cox, international 
institutions expand hegemony but “at the same time permit adjustments to be 
made by subordinate interests with a minimum of pain.”16 International law, then, 
is a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of hegemony. While it 
would be inaccurate to argue that international law never advances the interests 
of subordinate groups, the Gramscian perspective posits that international law is 
structured to incorporate these interests in a way that is minimally disruptive to 
hegemony. Insofar as the legal system is based on the interpretation of texts 
(treaties, conventions, etc.), international legal bodies are likely to synthesize 
potentially disruptive ideas so that they are consonant with hegemony. This 
process is evident in the treatment of the CHM principle at international law. 
While the CHM principle was advanced by NIEO nations as an economico-
corporative challenge to the hegemony of the Global North, the structure of 
international law guarantees that the principle will be re-interpreted at the 
hegemonic level through the process of trasformismo. 
                                                                                                                                            
15  Ibid at 168. 
16  Ibid at 172. 
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2. THE COMMON HERITAGE DOCTRINE IN SPACE LAW 
The CHM doctrine has been the site of an interpretive struggle between 
NIEO countries and the Western Bloc. While NIEO countries sought an 
interpretation of CHM that conformed to their social myth, the dominant 
Western Bloc attempted to transform the doctrine into an idea consistent with 
Western hegemony. The disappearance of the NIEO as a persuasive social myth 
has removed all insulation from the CHM principle, rendering it vulnerable to 
trasformismo. In practical terms, the result is that future interpretation of the CHM 
principle is likely to accord with free-market principles. 
2.1  Characteristics and Development 
Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo famously articulated the concept of the 
“common heritage of mankind” in his 1967 speech to the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. On behalf of the government of Malta, Pardo argued, “The 
seabed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and should be 
used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind 
as a whole.”17 Supporting this contention, Pardo argued that treating the seabed 
as res nullius (unclaimed territory upon which any nation may make a valid claim) 
would lead to a scramble to exploit the seabed’s resources, leading to “grave” 
consequences of global instability.18 Pardo was an international federalist, but his 
arguments echoed the concerns of decolonizing nations in the Global South. 
Both the deep seabed and outer space were believed to contain untold riches that 
were mere years or decades from human reach, and by asserting a pseudo-
beneficial ownership right over them, developing nations hoped to effect a 
redistribution of their benefits that would result in a sharing of wealth.19 
Commentators are divided on the precise characteristics of the common 
heritage doctrine. Alexandre Kiss writes, “The very nature of the common 
                                                                                                                                            
17  UNGA, 22d Sess, 1515th Mtg (1967). 
18  Ibid. 
19  Bradley Larschan & Bonnie C Brennan, “The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle in International 
Law” (1983) 21 Colum J Transnat’l L 305 at 309–310. 
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heritage seems to imply a form of trust under which the principal aims are rational 
use, good management, and transmission to future generations.”20 Meanwhile, 
Daniel Goedhuis identifies four characteristics of the common heritage doctrine:  
1. No nation may appropriate the territory. 
2. The territory is managed by all nations. 
3. The benefits of resource exploitation must be shared by all nations. 
4. The territory must be used for peaceful purposes.21 
John Noyes lists these factors and adds environmental protection.22 However, as 
discussed in greater detail below, the legal implications of CHM can be construed 
broadly or narrowly. 
2.2  The CHM Principle in Treaty Law 
2.2.1  The Outer Space Treaty 
Space law has its foundation in the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activity of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (conventionally called the “Outer Space Treaty”). The Outer Space Treaty 
came into force in October 1967. It has been signed and ratified by 102 nations, 
including all major space powers. The treaty’s preamble “recognize[s] the 
common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of 
outer space for peaceful purposes.”23 Pursuant to this objective, the treaty 
provides that no territorial sovereignty may be exercised over celestial bodies, and 
that the use of the resources of outer space “shall be carried out for the benefit 
and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”24 
                                                                                                                                            
20  Alexandre Kiss, “The Common Heritage of Mankind: Utopia or Reality?” (1985) 40 Int’l J 423 at 435 
21  Daniel Goedhuis, “Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the Rules of 
International Space Law” (1981) 19 Colum J Transnat’l L 213 at 218–19. 
22  John E Noyes, “The Common Heritage of Mankind: Past, Present, and Future” (2012) 40 Denv J Int’l L 
& Pol’y 447 at 450. 
23  Treaty of Principles Governing the Activity of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 8843. 
24  Ibid at art 1. 
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Although the text of the treaty captures many of the aspects of the CHM 
doctrine, the term “common heritage of mankind” does not appear in the text of 
the treaty. According to Zhao, while the terms are not interchangeable, they 
articulate similar principles for the exploitation of the resources of outer space. 
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the terms are functionally and legally 
equivalent.25 Others have argued that the language in the Outer Space Treaty is 
intentionally vague and cannot be understood as incorporating the CHM 
principle in its later formulations into space law.26 Eilene Galloway observes that, 
unlike the Law of the Sea treaty, “the space law plan has been to have a general 
treaty followed by expanding its provisions into separate treaties covering specific 
problem areas.”27 
2.2.2  The Moon Treaty 
One such “problem area” is the Moon (and its resources), the subject of the 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(commonly called the “Moon Treaty”), which was adopted in 1979 and entered 
into force in 1984. Although the CHM doctrine is perhaps most thoroughly 
developed in Part XI of the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982, the earliest articulation 
of CHM in its modern form comes from the of Moon Treaty.28 Article 11(1) of 
the Moon Treaty declares that “[t]he moon and its natural resources are the 
common heritage of mankind.”29 Like Part XI of the Law of the Sea treaty, the 
Moon Treaty reflects a desire on the part of NIEO nations to establish an 
international regime that would regulate the exploitation of resources according 
to the CHM principle—a challenge to the dominance of spacefaring superpowers 
through the mechanisms of international law.  
                                                                                                                                            
25  Yun Zhao, “An International Space Authority: A Governance Model for a Space Commercialization 
Regime” (2004) 30 J Space L 277 at 278–279. 
26  Larschan & Brennan, supra note 19 at 328. 
27  Eilene Galloway, “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” 
(1980) 5 Annals Am & Space L 481 at 507. 
28  Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) at 159. 
29  Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 5 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 
3, art 11 [“Moon Treaty”]. 
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Baslar describes the Moon Treaty as  
among the first contemporary international agreements through which 
the South raised its voice. From the perspective of developing 
countries “common heritage” meant common ownership and access 
approved by the international community on the basis of one nation-
one vote.30 
However, the final text of the treaty reflects the wide chasms between the parties 
who negotiated it. For example, Article 11(3) provides that any lunar resources 
“in place” cannot be the subjects of appropriation. The legal effect of this 
provision is ambiguous; it can be interpreted either as prohibiting the appropriation 
of resources, or as allowing persons or states to acquire full possessory rights over 
the resources, as the resources are not “in place.” The latter interpretation means 
that the environment itself would be terra communis—subject to no national 
appropriation—while the resources within the environment would be res nullius 
and subject to the appropriation of anyone who makes a valid claim.31 In other 
words, once the resources are moved, the treaty ceases to protect them. This 
interpretation clearly advantages spacefaring powers that are able to stake an early 
claim to the resources.  
The drafting of this provision represents a compromise between NIEO 
nations and the developed world. The former sought a moratorium on 
exploitation of lunar resources until an international authority could be 
established, while the latter sought a res nullius system.32 Bradley Larschan and 
Bonnie Brennan argue that the NIEO nations were willing to compromise on the 
moratorium in order to secure agreement on establishing an international space 
authority, which is the subject of Article 11(5). Under this model, an 
internationally managed entity “would possess exclusive rights to harvest 
                                                                                                                                            
30  Baslar, supra note 28 at 164. 
31  Ibid at 168–169 
32  Larschan & Brennan, supra note 19 at 329. 
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resources, and equitably distribute them among all states, regardless of which 
nations actually participated in the resource exploitation activities.”33  
Ultimately, however, the Moon Treaty has not received widespread 
ratification from either spacefaring nations or NIEO nations. In that sense, it may 
be characterized as a failed treaty.34 Given the Outer Space Treaty’s vagueness 
and the Moon Treaty’s limited acceptance, the legal effect of the CHM principle 
in space law is questionable. 
3. LEGAL EFFECT OF THE CHM PRINCIPLE  
The brief overview above illustrates the process of hegemony at work. The 
NIEO nations self-consciously strived to challenge the Cold War balance of 
power and to establish themselves as an alternate hegemonic power. In doing so, 
they framed their struggle in terms of a social myth, of which the CHM principle 
is one aspect.  
3.1  Conflicting Interpretations 
3.1.1  NIEO Nations 
Larschan and Brennan view common heritage doctrine as the “legal 
equivalent” to the emergence of a New International Economic Order.35 Lacking 
the military or technological capability to contest wealthy nations’ claims to the 
resources of the deep seabed, Antarctica, and outer space, states in the Global 
South leveraged their numerical influence at the United Nations General 
Assembly to enshrine the common heritage principle in international law.36 In 
Gramscian terms, they sought to establish a counter-hegemony.  
                                                                                                                                            
33  Harminderpal Singh Rana, “The ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ & the Final Frontier: A Revaluation of 
Values Constituting the International Legal Regime for Outer Space Activities” (1994) 26 Rutgers LJ 225 
at 230–231. 
34  Baslar, supra note 28 at 175–177. 
35  Larschan & Brennan, supra note 19 at 305–306. 
36  Ibid at 309–311. 
152 SPACE LAW Vol. 24 
	
According to Rana, developing nations have historically sought to interpret 
CHM broadly, conferring something akin to common property rights upon the 
thing that is the common heritage of mankind.37 Interpreted broadly, the principle 
could permit a redistribution of the vast wealth that, according to conventional 
wisdom of the time, could be extracted from the seabed or from outer space. 
Such a redistribution was consistent with the social myth of the NIEO, whose 
telos was economic parity between the Global South and the North.38 
Using the Gramscian framework, the NIEO nations interpreted the CHM 
principle at the economico-corporative level. In other words, they interpreted it 
according to the needs of their own subordinated group. Given that international 
law is a mechanism for the preservation of hegemony, it is unlikely that any 
economico-corporative interpretation of a legal concept can have a sustained impact 
at international law. Any formulation of the idea will be subject to trasformismo in 
order to become acceptable to the hegemonic bloc. In the case of the CHM 
principle, the disintegration of the NIEO bloc has accelerated the process of 
trasformismo. 
Academic commentators have characterized the 1970s as the Golden Age 
of the NIEO, after which the movement gradually declined in the 1980s as severe 
debt crises gripped the Global South. By the end of the Cold War, much of the 
cohesiveness of the 1970s had disappeared.39 In Gramscian terms, the alternate 
social myth had ceased to be relevant. As a result, CHM may be construed as an 
orphaned principle, one whose textual existence has outlived the ideological 
systems and social conditions from which it originated. 
3.1.2  Industrialized Nations 
The failure or refusal of any spacefaring power to ratify the Moon Treaty 
demonstrates the deep suspicion harboured by developed nations of attempts to 
create enforceable rights in international law on the distribution of space 
                                                                                                                                            
37  Rana, supra note 33 at 230 
38  Ruth Gordon, “The Dawn of a New, New International Economic Order” (2009) 72:4 Law & Contemp 
Probs 144 at 145–148. 
39  Ibid at 131–162. See also Mark Berger, “After the Third World? History, Destiny, and the Fate of Third 
Worldism” (2004) 25:1 Third World Quarterly 25 at 39.  
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resources. Part of this suspicion can be explained by the ideological climate of the 
1970s: Western powers were suspicious of any legal concept that smacked of 
socialism and inhibited the ability of market forces to govern the exploitation of 
resources.40 Similarly, the Eastern Bloc was suspicious of the CHM doctrine 
because, while the issues of non-appropriation of lunar resources aligned with 
Marxist-Leninist theory, the concepts of “mankind” and “heritage”  were 
inconsistent with the Marxist-Leninist understanding of international law.41 
Industrialized nations such as the United States have tended to take a view 
of CHM that is in keeping with free-market principles. Commenting on the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, President Clinton once 
asserted that it is “the consistent view of the United States that the common 
heritage principle fully comports with private economic activity in accordance 
with market principles.”42 Furthermore, Anand observes that a number of 
Western diplomats maintain that the CHM principle is an aspirational goal with 
no binding legal content.43 Both positions represent the process of trasformismo of 
the CHM principle to the level of hegemony. Interpreted in this manner, CHM 
plays second fiddle to free-market liberalism, the universalistic social myth of the 
dominant group.  
The fate of the CHM principle in each of the space treaties illustrates a 
different aspect of hegemony at work. In the Outer Space Treaty, the term 
“common interest” is left undefined. As such, it is not threatening to the 
dominant group, but secures the consent of the subordinate groups that view it 
as at least potentially compatible with their interests. With the Moon Treaty, the 
dominant powers simply did not ratify it, leaving open the option to coercively 
develop international law by unilateral action. In either case, it is clear that 
spacefaring nations will not be bound by a broad interpretation of the CHM 
principle based on either treaty.  
                                                                                                                                            
40  Rana, supra note 33 at 231–232. 
41  Baslar, supra note 28 at 163–164.  
42  Quoted in ibid at 219–220. 
43  RP Anand, Studies in International Law and History: An Asian Perspective (Lieden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004) at 182. 
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3.2  The CHM Principle and Customary International Law 
Some scholars have argued that the widespread acceptance of the Outer 
Space Treaty is evidence that the CHM principle exists as customary international 
law.44 However, such a claim is dubious considering the lack of certainty as to 
whether the principle has legal force at all, let alone what its precise ramifications 
are. 
3.2.1  A Gramscian Perspective on the Formation of Custom 
According to Fry, treaties represent the most consent-based source of 
international law, and general legal principles are the most coercive. Custom exists 
somewhere between these extremes.45 Custom is comprised of consistent state 
practice coupled with opinio juris.46 Opinio juris is an expression of state consent. 
The hegemonic aspects of custom become apparent when custom is enforced 
against a non-compliant state. 
Fry refers to the North Sea Continental Shelf cases and notes that they 
articulate “the notion of specially affected states determining custom.”47 Seafaring 
powers with well-developed habits of maritime activity find those habits 
universalized in the form of custom. Given the immense resources required for 
a nation or private actor to develop a space program, the process of custom-
making would be highly influenced by, and presumably consonant with the 
interests of, spacefaring powers. Being unable to travel to space, other nations are 
unable to shape the formation of custom by state acts. In this way, the structure 
of custom formation is conducive to the establishment of hegemony. 
                                                                                                                                            
44  Ricky J Lee, “Reconciling International Space Law with the Commercial Realities of the Twenty-first 
Century” (2000) 4 Sing J Int’l & Comp L 194 at 203. 
45  Fry, supra note 6 at 326. 
46  Hugh M Kindred, Phillip M Saunders et al, eds, International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 
8th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2014) at 31. 
47  Fry, supra note 6 at 327. 
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3.2.2  The CHM Principle as Objection 
Given the limited scope of extra-orbital space activity, it is doubtful that 
there could be much basis to find the existence of a custom. Large-scale 
commercial extraction of resources from celestial bodies has not occurred, nor 
has the militarization of such bodies. While the Outer Space Treaty received 
widespread ratification and may suggest state acceptance of the CHM principle 
in space law, this article has argued that the text of that treaty offers little in the 
way of substantial legal direction for space policy at the present time.  
However, in the context of Cold War imperialism, it is not surprising that 
the spectre of full-scale militarization and commercial exploitation of space 
figured prominently in the minds of NIEO nations. By including the language of 
CHM in the treaties, developing nations sought to pre-empt such a scenario. 
Because of the principle’s controversial nature, it may be best understood as an 
explicit, pre-emptive objection to the formation of customary international law 
that would permit the militarization and unilateral resource exploitation of space.  
CONCLUSION 
Based on a Gramscian analysis, the CHM principle has had little substantial 
impact on space law in terms of lex lata. Although NIEO nations were partially 
successful in enshrining CHM in the text of existing space treaties, the principle 
is too vague in the Outer Space Treaty to have much practical impact on future 
space travel, and the Moon Treaty has only 16 parties, none of which are major 
space powers.48 Similarly, it has not achieved the widespread acceptance necessary 
to exist in customary law. Given the dominance of space travel in the 20th century 
by imperialistic superpowers, any interpretation of the CHM principle would be 
consonant with the preservation of hegemony. 
However, the changing context of the 21st century may ignite new interest 
in the CHM principle in terms of lex ferenda. In the United States, space travel is 
                                                                                                                                            
48  “Moon Treaty,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs online: <disarmament.un.org/treaties/ 
t/moon>. 
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increasingly privatized and commercialized, while China, the European Union, 
India, and other nations have space programs that are more active than ever 
before. While it is too early to make predictions about the state of Western 
hegemony, renewed interest in space travel by a greater number of nations and 
private actors is likely to bring about a rapid development in space law. If this is 
the case, it may well be that the CHM principle will be subject to new 
interpretations.  
 
